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THE ROBERT L. LEVINE DISTINGUISHED
LECTURE SERIES
THE PARADOXICAL STRUCTURE OF
CONSTITUTIONAL LITIGATION
Pamela S. Karlan*
INTRODUCTION
In The Paradoxes of Legal Science, Benjamin Cardozo observed that
courts had not provided a straightforward and comprehensive definition of
the "due process" protected by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.
Instead, he said, "[w]e will leave it to be 'pricked out' by a process of
inclusion and exclusion in individual cases."' The question, he declared,
is how long we are to be satisfied with a series of ad hoc conclusions. It
is all very well to go on pricking the lines, but the time must come when
we shall do prudently to look them over, and see whether they make a
pattern or a medley of scraps and patches. 2
A similar point could be made about many of the clauses that shape the
government's interaction with individual citizens. The Fourth Amendment,
the First Amendment, the Equal Protection Clause-all of these are
continuously being "pricked out" by litigation. Constitutional provisions
consisting of only a single sentence of text have flowered into elaborate
codes of conduct.3
The central argument of this essay is that the process of constitutional
litigation has itself become a medley of scraps and patches. The United
States Supreme Court has pieced together a crazy quilt of constitutional
* Kenneth and Harle Montgomery Professor of Public Interest Law, Stanford Law School. I
presented an earlier version of this essay as the Robert L. Levine Lecture at Fordham Law
School on November 9, 2006. I also presented prior versions of my argument at faculty
workshops at DePaul, Stanford, and the University of North Carolina, and each time I
received helpful comments and suggestions. The ideas in this essay have benefited from
countless conversations over the years with Viola Canales, John Jeffries, and Bill Stuntz.
Finally, Paul Hughes provided invaluable research assistance that materially changed my
thinking on some of the issues I discuss.
1. Benjamin N. Cardozo, The Paradoxes of Legal Science 96 (1928) (footnote omitted).
2. Id.
3. For an extensive discussion of how this process involves institution- and situation-
specific rules, see generally Symposium, Constitutional "Niches ": The Role of Institutional
Context in Constitutional Law, 54 UCLA L. Rev. (forthcoming 2007).
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doctrines that undercut its central goal of intelligently and efficiently
refining broad constitutional commands. Constitutional law is primarily a
way of regulating governments. With respect to those constitutional
provisions that confer rights on specific individuals,4 one need not insist
that these rights must inevitably trump countervailing governmental
interests 5 to recognize that they should generally be protected by more than
mere "liability rules" under which the government is entitled to "destroy the
initial entitlement if [it] is willing to pay an objectively determined value
for it."'6 Put differently, the overarching purpose of constitutional law is to
deter or prevent deprivations of individuals' rights, and not simply to
induce the government to internalize their costs or to compensate
individuals who suffer them after the fact.7
Constitutional litigation is paradoxical in at least two important ways.
First, the litigation system contains gaps between the incentives and
4. Some constitutional provisions are entirely structural and do not give rise to
justiciable individual claims at all. For example, the Guarantee Clause provides that "[t]he
United States shall grant to every State in this Union a Republican Form of Government."
U.S. Const. art. IV, § 4. The Supreme Court has consistently held that the Clause confers no
justiciable right on individual citizens who wish to challenge their states' form of
government. See, e.g., Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962); Pac. States Tel. & Tel. Co. v.
Oregon, 223 U.S. 118 (1912); Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1 (1849). By contrast,
other constitutional provisions contain explicit "rights creating" language. (For an
explanation of this term in the context of statutory interpretation, see Alexander v. Sandoval,
532 U.S. 275, 288-89 (2001).) For example, the First Amendment refers to "the right of the
people peaceably to assemble," U.S. Const. amend. I, the Fourth Amendment refers to the
"right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures," U.S. Const. amend. IV, and the Fifteenth, Nineteenth,
Twenty-fourth, and Twenty-sixth Amendments refer to the right of citizens of the United
States to vote, U.S. Const. amends. XV, XIX, XXIV, XXVI. Others use slightly less explicit
language whose rights creation is nonetheless clear. For example, the Fourteenth
Amendment prohibits states from "depriv[ing] any person of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law" or "deny[ing] to any person.., the equal protection of the
laws," thereby clearly conferring an enforceable entitlement on individual citizens.
5. This is the position taken in Ronald Dworkin's influential work. See Ronald
Dworkin, Rights as Trumps, in Theories of Rights 153 (Jeremy Waldron ed., 1984). For a
persuasive critique of this position, see Richard H. Pildes, Why Rights Are Not Trumps:
Social Meanings, Expressive Harms, and Constitutionalism, 27 J. Legal Stud. 725 (1998).
6. This terminology comes from Guido Calabresi and A. Douglas Melamed's classic
article, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85
Harv. L. Rev. 1089, 1092 (1972). Calabresi and Melamed contrast "liability rules" for
protecting rights with "property rules" under which "someone who wishes to remove the
entitlement from its holder must buy it from him in a voluntary transaction in which the
value of the entitlement is agreed upon by the seller." Id. In the case of constitutional rights,
this means that the government must induce the rights holder to voluntarily and intelligently
waive his rights. See, e.g., Iowa v. Tovar, 541 U.S. 77, 81 (2004) (explaining that "[w]aiver
of the right to counsel, as of constitutional rights in the criminal process generally, must be a
knowing, intelligent ac[t] done with sufficient awareness of the relevant circumstances"
(internal quotation marks omitted)); Evans v. Jeff D., 475 U.S. 717, 730-32 (1986)
(permitting waiver of the statutory right to attorney's fees in § 1983 cases because a
voluntary and intelligent waiver may be part of a party's bargaining strategy).
7. The Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment is exceptional precisely because it
permits the government to take private property for public use as long as it provides "just
compensation." U.S. Const. amend. V.
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abilities of individual litigants to pursue constitutional claims on the one
hand and the need for constitutional refinement on the other. Second,
although constitutional law is intended to regulate the government
prospectively, a variety of doctrines have channeled much of the process of
constitutional refinement into retrospective damages lawsuits against
individual government officials. This litigation itself is hedged about by a
series of doctrines that undercut the processes of constitutional refinement.
I. CONSTITUTIONAL SHIELDS AND CONSTITUTIONAL SWORDS: WHEN Do
INDIVIDUALS EVEN LITIGATE THEIR CONSTITUTIONAL CLAIMS?
Much of constitutional law-particularly the provisions that govern
things like law enforcement, public employment, and education-involves
the refinement of broad constitutional commands into essentially regulatory
codes of conduct. Precisely because governmental bodies, such as school
boards, police departments, municipalities, state agencies, and the like, are
bureaucratic repeat players, they often operate by setting policies designed
to ensure that their employees comply with the latest constitutional
commands.
While governments' articulation of policies may be subject to a variety of
processes ranging from formalized administrative notice-and-comment
rulemaking to various forms of institutionalized citizen participation, the
underlying constitutional commands that prompt a government to articulate
these policies often have their genesis in judicial decisions. The kinds of
cases that can or are likely to be litigated thus powerfully affect which areas
of constitutional law get full elaboration and which are left only loosely
construed.
Certain pieces of constitutional doctrine are articulated largely as
defenses within lawsuits initiated for reasons independent of any desire to
make constitutional law. The government initiates criminal prosecutions
not for the purpose of refining the contours of constitutional doctrines
governing police practices, but for the purpose of convicting and punishing
criminal behavior. But in the course of defending themselves against
criminal charges, individuals often assert constitutional claims under the
Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Amendments. These claims are shields: In their
most common form, they involve a defendant's argument that the
government cannot use a particular piece of evidence because it was
obtained in violation of the Constitution.
We see a lot of this form of constitutional litigation for three major
reasons. First, there is a powerful motivation for individuals to raise these
claims; they may be the only way of avoiding a criminal conviction and the
disastrous consequences that follow. Second, the Sixth Amendment
guarantee of appointed counsel, which provides upwards of eighty percent
2007] 1915
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of criminal defendants with a free lawyer,8 makes it relatively costless for
most defendants to litigate their constitutional criminal procedure claims.9
Third, these claims are decided by judges, during suppression hearings,
rather than by juries; since unconstitutional conduct often targets unpopular
groups or individuals, victims are likely to fare better before judges than
juries.
The interaction of these factors, however, means that law enforcement
behavior that does not directly undergird criminal prosecutions-such as
the harassment of innocent citizens or even the use of substantial physical
force to arrest criminal suspects-is less likely to be litigated. The effort of
finding a lawyer and bringing a lawsuit can be substantial. The potential
relief may be either diffuse, in the case of equitable remedies, or relatively
small, in the case of damages lawsuits by unpopular plaintiffs. The result is
that we have a far better code of conduct governing the conditions for
police searches than for police uses of force.' 0 There are relatively few
clear lines in the use of force area-other than the rejection of the fleeing
felon doctrine in Tennessee v. Garner,I I I am hard pressed to think of one-
while search and seizure doctrine is marbled with such rules.
It is not entirely clear to me that if we were starting from scratch in trying
to think about how to refine constitutional constraints on police conduct we
would choose this allocation. We might prefer that more judicial attention
be given to police uses of force, or more general police treatment of
civilians during encounters. Exclusion of evidence is a powerful remedy,
but it vindicates the rights only of defendants against whom evidence was
seized. Individuals who are searched fruitlessly, even if maliciously,
benefit only indirectly from our current Fourth Amendment regime.
A second set of cases treats the Constitution not as a shield protecting
defendants, but as a sword to be used in seeking prospective relief. In these
cases, plaintiffs attack government policies, arguing that the policies are
unconstitutional and should be enjoined. Structural reform litigation under
the Eighth Amendment challenging prison conditions and under the Equal
8. See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (construing the Sixth Amendment
to require appointed counsel for indigent defendants in felony cases); William J. Stuntz, The
Uneasy Relationship Between Criminal Procedure and Criminal Justice, 107 Yale L.J. 1, 32(1997) (stating that roughly eighty percent of defendants receive appointed counsel).
9. Professor Stuntz also points out that the structure of appointed counsel's practice
tends to drive them toward raising relatively inexpensive-to-litigate constitutional claims
rather than more time-intensive claims regarding factual innocence. Stuntz, supra note 8, at
39-42.
10. For elaboration of this point, see Christopher Slobogin, Why Liberals Should Chuck
the Exclusionary Rule, 1999 U. Ill. L. Rev. 363, 402; William J. Stuntz, Privacy's Problem
and the Law of Criminal Procedure, 93 Mich. L. Rev. 1016, 1068 (1995).
11. 471 U.S. 1 (1985) (rejecting the common-law rule that permitted police to use
deadly force to capture a fleeing felon without regard to whether the suspect posed a threat).
1916 [Vol. 75
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Protection Clause challenging racial segregation in public schools are
paradigmatic examples of this kind of litigation.12
But here we come upon a phenomenon that is captured in a backhanded
way by the Supreme Court's restrictive standing decision in City of Los
Angeles v. Lyons. 13 In that case, Adolph Lyons was injured by a Los
Angeles police officer who subjected him to a choke hold after a traffic
stop. Lyons alleged, and the district court ultimately found, that the use of
the choke hold was consistent with police department policy.14 Lyons sued,
seeking both damages for the injuries he had suffered as a result of the
choke hold and an injunction forcing the city to change its policies
regarding the use of choke holds. The Supreme Court ultimately held that
he lacked standing to seek injunctive relief because Lyons could not show a
reasonable probability that he personally faced any risk of a future choke
hold that injunctive relief might prevent. 15
Seen in one light, Lyons is a flawed decision. The only reason, as we
shall see in a moment, why Lyons could even sue the city for injuries he
had already suffered was because the city had a policy that permitted the
choke hold to which he had been subjected. 16 It was almost a dead
certainty, literally, that there would be future injurious choke holds. The
only question was who would be victimized. If Lyons could not seek
injunctive relief, then no one could. And so the city could go on choke
holding individuals in violation of the Fourth Amendment as long as it was
willing to pay damages at the back end--damages that were not likely to
capture the full measure of the constitutional injury, and were thus unlikely
to fully deter unconstitutional conduct, precisely because the city's policy
was politically popular.17 Thus, to the extent that constitutional litigation is
intended not only to compensate past victims but to change future practices,
the Lyons standing rule is counterproductive.
But Lyons does reflect a broader insight: Lyons's presence in court
seeking injunctive relief was a fortuitous consequence of his past injury. It
is unclear why he should be authorized, or even trusted, to represent the
interests of an unnamed and unknowable class of other potential victims.
Suppose, for example, that individuals in Lyons's position were entitled to
seek both monetary and injunctive relief. Having sought both kinds of
remedy, should there be any restriction on their right to trade off one for the
other? If Lyons can get a higher monetary settlement by abandoning his
claim for injunctive relief, then is that not because he is sacrificing other
12. We discuss these examples and provide citations to the voluminous literature in John
C. Jeffries, Jr., Pamela S. Karlan, Peter W. Low, & George A. Rutherglen, Civil Rights
Actions: Enforcing the Constitution 745-897 (2000).
13. 461 U.S. 95 (1983).
14. See id. at 99.
15. See id. at 105-10.
16. See infra text accompanying notes 34-41.
17. For a discussion of Lyons and its constriction of structural relief in police brutality
cases, see Barbara E. Armacost, Organizational Culture and Police Misconduct, 72 Geo.
Wash. L. Rev. 453, 490-93 (2004).
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individuals' rights? Even if Lyons is certified as the representative of all
persons who might face future unconstitutional choke holds, recent
experiences in class action litigation suggest at least some caution in
assuming that he has the correct incentives to litigate the injunctive claim
vigorously. 18
In any event, injunctive relief alone would often be an incomplete
remedy for the injuries suffered by a victim of unconstitutional conduct.
People like Lyons experience physical pain and suffering, incur medical
expenses, and lose wages. Public employees wrongfully terminated from
their jobs for political or free expression reasons may lose wages,
experience mental anguish, or suffer impairment of their reputations. 19
Simply reforming departmental practices or giving people their jobs back
does not fully compensate them for the losses they have suffered.
II. CONSTITUTIONAL CHANNELING: THE CENTRALITY OF § 1983
Damages litigation offers an opportunity not only to compensate
individuals who have been injured by unconstitutional conduct, but to refine
constitutional law as well. As one of the elements of a plaintiffs case, he
must prove that the defendant violated the Constitution. That holding
serves as a precedent, providing future guidance to governmental entities
regarding the scope of constitutional constraints. The prospect of future
damages can induce the government to change its policies to avoid further
liability.
But there are three critical limitations on constitutional damages
litigation. The first is itself constitutional, and stems from the Eleventh
Amendment. The pertinent text provides only that "[t]he Judicial power of
the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or
equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by
Citizens of another State." 20 Nevertheless, the Eleventh Amendment has
been construed to preclude suits against non-consenting states by their own
citizens, either in federal or state court.2 1
18. See, e.g., Amchem Prod., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 625-28 (1997) (finding a
fatal conflict of interest between the named class representatives and some members of the
class); see also Lee Anderson, Comment, Preserving Adequacy of Representation When
Dropping Claims in Class Actions, 74 U. Mo. K.C. L. Rev. 105 (2005) (discussing when it is
appropriate for a class representative to drop some of the claims class members might
otherwise have).
19. For a comprehensive treatment of the damages available in cases brought under 42
U.S.C. § 1983-the most wide-ranging federal statute authorizing individual lawsuits for
constitutional violations-see 1B Martin A. Schwartz & John E. Kirklin, Section 1983
Litigation: Claims and Defenses §§ 16.7-.15 (3d ed. 1997).
20. U.S. Const. amend. XI.
21. See Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 735-40 (1999) (extending the Eleventh
Amendment's principle of sovereign immunity to lawsuits against non-consenting states in
their own courts); Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890) (holding that states cannot be sued
without their consent in federal court). My colleague Larry Marshall has argued that the
amendment was in fact carefully crafted to take account of the fact that "[t]he vast majority
of state [constitutional] violations affecting individuals involve in-state citizens," whose
1918 [Vol. 75
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But as Maria says in The Sound of Music, when God closes a door, He
opens a window. The Supreme Court has taken an expansive, but formal,
view of the Eleventh Amendment. 22 So it has construed the Amendment to
bar litigation against the state and state-level entities such as the state
police 23 in their own names, but not against state officials or local
governments,24 even if those officials or governments are carrying out
entirely nondiscretionary state-level policies. 25 The Supreme Court needed
this safety valve to strike down de jure segregation, 26 Alabama's use of
hitching posts,27 and that worst-of-all constitutional violation, favoritism for
in-state wineries. 28 And so we have doctrines like the Ex parte Young
fiction: 29 Although the only reason the individual defendant can be sued is
because he's acting under color of state law, 30  when he acts
unconstitutionally, the official will be "stripped of his official or
representative character" and treated as an individual.31
claims do not fall within the literal terms of the amendment. See Lawrence C. Marshall,
Fighting the Words of the Eleventh Amendment, 102 Harv. L. Rev. 1342, 1368 (1989).
22. For a more extensive discussion of this point, see John C. Jeffries, Jr., In Praise of
the Eleventh Amendment and Section 1983, 84 Va. L. Rev. 47, 49 (1998) (observing that the
scathing criticism of the Supreme Court's Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence "neglects a
crucial fact: The Eleventh Amendment almost never matters" and that "[m]ost discussions
proceed on the (often unstated) assumption that Eleventh Amendment immunity, when
applicable, categorically forbids actions against states," which is "formally true but
substantively misleading").
23. See, e.g., Alabama v. Pugh, 438 U.S. 781, 782 (1978) (holding that the Alabama
Board of Corrections is entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity). See generally Alex E.
Rogers, Note, Clothing State Governmental Entities with Sovereign Immunity: Disarray in
the Eleventh Amendment Arm-of-the-State Doctrine, 92 Colum. L. Rev. 1243 (1992)
(exploring which governments fall within the definition of "states" for purposes of Eleventh
Amendment immunity).
24. In Lincoln County v. Luning, 133 U.S. 529 (1890), decided the same day as Hans,
the Supreme Court held that counties are not entitled to invoke Eleventh Amendment
sovereign immunity. The Court has made clear that this amenability to suit extends to other
political subunits as well. See, e.g., Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429
U.S. 274 (1977) (school boards); Workman v. City of New York, 179 U.S. 552 (1900)
(cities).
25. See, e.g., Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 27-28 (1991) (holding that state officers may
be held liable in their personal capacity for actions undertaken in their official capacity).
26. See, e.g., Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (in a lawsuit against a city
board of education, holding that a state segregation statute violates the Equal Protection
Clause).
27. See Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 737-38 (2002) (in a lawsuit against individual
prison officials, holding that the use of the hitching post to punish prisoners violates the
Eighth Amendment).
28. See Granholm v. Heald, 544 U.S. 460 (2005) (in a lawsuit against the Governor of
Michigan, holding that the state's policies with regard to the interstate shipment of wine
violated the dormant Commerce Clause).
29. Exparte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
30. The constitutional provisions at issue in Exparte Young-the Due Process and Equal
Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment, see id. at 144-45-apply only to state
action. See Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883). So unless the individual defendants were
acting under color of state law, they would not be amenable to suit under the fourteenth
amendment at all.
31. Exparte Young, 209 U.S. at 160.
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Thus, the main effect of the Eleventh Amendment is not, standing alone,
to foreclose all challenge to state policies, but rather to rechannel such
litigation into other forms, principally individual officer suits or suits
against lower-level governments that actually implement state law. 32
A second barrier comes into play in lawsuits involving municipal
governments. Although counties, school boards, municipal governments,
and their departments can be sued for violating individuals' rights, the
Supreme Court has placed a substantial limitation on when such
governments will be liable for constitutional violations committed by their
employees. The statutory handle for bringing damages lawsuits for
constitutional violations is 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 33 In Monell v. Department of
Social Services of New York, 34 the Court held that the language of § 1983
that imposes liability on any actor that "cause[s]" the "deprivation" of
constitutional rights does not embody a theory of respondeat superior;35 a
government entity causes a deprivation only when the deprivation occurs
pursuant to its official policy.36 Sometimes, of course, it is easy to show
policy: When a city enacts an unconstitutional ordinance, for example, any
ensuing injury falls within the scope of Monell liability.37 But there are
many areas where it is exceptionally difficult to show that the challenged
action involves an unwritten policy. 38 Although governments are repeat
players, plaintiffs are not: Even if a particular violation occurs sufficiently
often that a fact finder aware of the government's behavior over time could
infer that there is an unconstitutional "custom" sufficient to trigger entity-
level liability,39 individual plaintiffs may be unlikely to have sufficient
32. See Jeffries, supra note 22, at 50-51.
33. That section provides, in pertinent part, that
[elvery person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom,
or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes
to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the
jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities
secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an
action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress ....
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000). The Supreme Court has explained that § 1983 creates a cause of
action for constitutional violations. See Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 144 n.3 (1979);
Chapman v. Houston Welfare Rights Org., 441 U.S. 600, 617 (1979).
34. 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
35. Id. at 691-95.
36. See id. at 694.
37. See City of St. Louis v. Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112, 121 (1988) (explaining that under
Monell, a municipality may "be sued directly if it is alleged to have caused a constitutional
tort through 'a policy statement, ordinance, regulation, or decision officially adopted and
promulgated by that body's officers"' (quoting Monell, 436 U.S. at 690)).
38. For an extensive treatment of this issue, see chapter 7 of Schwartz & Kirklin, supra
note 19.
39. For discussions of cases finding municipal customs sufficient to trigger § 1983
liability, see Karen Blum, The Theory of Municipal Custom and Practice, 16 Touro L. Rev.
825, 830-39 (2000); Myriam E. Gilles, Breaking the Code of Silence: Rediscovering
"Custom" in Section 1983 Municipal Liability, 80 B.U. L. Rev. 17 (2000). For a discussion
of the meaning of "custom" at the time § 1983 was enacted, see George A. Rutherglen, The
1920 [Vol. 75
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information to plead; let alone to prove without substantial discovery, such
a de facto policy.40 Often, the "policy," if there is one, is simply not to
devote sufficient resources to preventing the problem, by, for example,
training line-level employees to comply with constitutional commands.
While the Supreme Court has recognized the theoretical availability of so-
called "failure to train claims," 41 in practice, such claims are seldom
successful. 4
2
This leaves lawsuits against individual officers, seeking damages, as a
key forum for refining constitutional law. But here, a third doctrine plays a
critical role. Precisely because constitutional litigation is an arena for
constitutional refinement, many cases arise where the unconstitutionality of
the official's act was not entirely clear at the time of the underlying
events. 43 Perhaps because the Court has come to believe the fiction that the
defendants in § 1983 suits against individual officers are actually being sued
as individuals, rather than as faithful agents of the government, 44 the Court
worries that imposing liability will be unfair. After all, the defendant had
no reason to know when he acted that he would be held liable, and it is not
as if he can capture all the benefits of his unconstitutional act in the first
place. 45 The Court is also concerned about undercutting government
operations; individual officers face an incentive to do nothing, since
inaction will not present the risk of a lawsuit, whereas an affirmative act
may pose such a threat. 46 Consider the teacher faced with an unruly
student. If the teacher suspends the student, she may face suit under the
Due Process Clause or the Equal Protection Clause or the First
Improbable History of Section 1981: Clio Still Bemused and Confused, 2003 Sup. Ct. Rev.
303, 332-34.
40. For a discussion of discovery in Monell cases, see G. Flint Taylor, A Litigator's
View of Discovery and Proof in Police Misconduct Policy and Practice Cases, 48 DePaul L.
Rev. 747 (1999).
41. See City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 390 (1989) (holding that "it may happen
that in light of the duties assigned to specific officers or employees the need for more or
different training is so obvious, and the inadequacy so likely to result in the violation of
constitutional rights, that the policymakers of the city can reasonably be said to have been
deliberately indifferent to the need," and that "[i]n that event, the failure to provide proper
training may fairly be said to represent a policy for which the city is responsible, and for
which the city may be held liable if it actually causes injury").
42. See Armacost, supra note 17, at 472.
43. See John C. Jeffries, Jr., The Right-Remedy Gap in Constitutional Law, 109 Yale L.J.
87, 95-98 (1999) (discussing the prevalence of constitutional innovation and the recognition
of new constraints on government action).
44. See Jeffries, supra note 22, at 50 (stating that, with the exceptions of "flamboyantly
bad actors" and officials "who become targets of criminal prosecution" for their
unconstitutional conduct, "the state or local government officer who is acting within the
scope of his or her employment in something other than extreme bad faith can count on
government defense and indemnification"); Cornelia T. L. Pillard, Taking Fiction Seriously:
The Strange Results of Public Officials' Individual Liability Under Bivens, 88 Geo. L.J. 65,
76-77 (1999) (pointing out that in constitutional tort cases brought against federal officials,
indemnification is a virtual certainty).
45. See Jeffries, Karlan, Low & Rutherglen, supra note 12, at 89.
46. See id. at 90.
19212007]
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Amendment.47 If she does nothing, this may undermine the education of all
the other students in the room, but they will have no constitutional cause of
action.
And so the Court has developed-legislated, indeed-the doctrine of
qualified immunity. An individual government official will be held liable
for unconstitutional conduct only if the unconstitutionality of the conduct
was already "clearly established" at the time he acted. 48 That standard thus
raises two questions: First, was the defendant's conduct unconstitutional?
Second, was that unconstitutionality clearly established at the time? A
plaintiff can win only if the answer to both questions is "yes."
Often, it will be easier to answer the second question.49 If there are no
cases directly on point, it might be quicker to simply conclude that the law
is unclear, rather than spend time and effort trying to determine how the law
ought to be clarified. But here is another paradox: If courts are
systematically drawn to answering the second question first, the law will
never be clarified; every court will simply duck reaching a constitutional
conclusion. In areas where litigation posture, the Eleventh Amendment,
and Monell combine to relegate constitutional refinement to individual
damages litigation, refinement will never occur.
And so, in Wilson v. Layne50 and Saucier v. Katz, 5 1 the Supreme Court
refined the qualified immunity inquiry. The Court directed courts faced
with a claim of immunity to consider a "threshold question":
Taken in the light most favorable to the party asserting the injury, do the
facts alleged show the officer's conduct violated a constitutional right?
This must be the initial inquiry. In the course of determining whether a
constitutional right was violated on the premises alleged, a court might
find it necessary to set forth principles which will become the basis for a
holding that a right is clearly established. This is the process for the law's
elaboration from case to case, and it is one reason for our insisting upon
turning to the existence or nonexistence of a constitutional right as the
first inquiry. The law might be deprived of this explanation were a court
47. See, e.g., Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 250-51 (1978) (describing the
unconstitutional suspension of one plaintiff for wearing an earring to school).
48. Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 639 (1987) ("[W]hether an official protected
by qualified immunity may be held personally liable for an allegedly unlawful official action
generally turns on the 'objective legal reasonableness' of the action ... assessed in light of
the legal rules that were 'clearly established' at the time it was taken . (citations
omitted)).
49. See Brosseau v. Haugen, 543 U.S. 194, 201-02 (2004) (Breyer, J., concurring)
(pointing out that it is often "easier" to determine qualified immunity than to decide
"difficult constitutional" questions); Kalka v. Hawk, 215 F.3d 90, 94-98 (D.C. Cir. 2000)
(holding that when resolution of the constitutional question involved an extensive factual
investigation but qualified immunity was clearly available, a court was permitted to bypass
the substantive constitutional question); Eric H. Zagrans, 'Under Color of" What Law: A
Reconstructed Model of Section 1983 Liability, 71 Va. L. Rev. 499, 585 (1985) (noting that
"[b]ecause the immunity is likely to be easier to determine than the plaintiffs constitutional
claim, the courts will prefer to dispose of the affirmative defense first").
50. 526 U.S. 603 (1999).
51. 533 U.S. 194 (2001).
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simply to skip ahead to the question whether the law clearly established
that the officer's conduct was unlawful in the circumstances of the case. 52
Wilson v. Layne itself illustrates an important point. Defendants may often
still win: Having decided unanimously that the Fourth Amendment is
violated when media ride-alongs permit the press to enter an individual's
home when the police execute a warrant,53 the Court then determined 8-1 in
the next section of its opinion that the rule would not have been clear to a
reasonable police officer before it had announced it.54 But although the
individual officer wins, and the plaintiff thus takes nothing, the law has
been refined and government officials-and more importantly, the agencies
that employ them (and that actually pay the costs of defending them even in
these refining lawsuits)-are on notice that they must change their conduct.
That is probably why car chase shows have replaced COPS episodes
involving police confronting shady characters inside their homes. A critical
assumption of the Wilson-Saucier framework, of course, is that the law is
actually being laid down in stage one of the qualified immunity inquiry, in a
fashion that parallels declaratory judgments. The Court's goals would not
be furthered if the first-stage answer were treated simply as dicta. 55 But
this gives rise to a paradoxical pair of pyrrhic victories. Because the
individual official has won the case-judgment is entered for him on
grounds of qualified immunity-he has neither the incentive nor the right to
appeal. 56 While the plaintiff of course has the right to appeal, he may have
little incentive or ability to do so. 57 If the case ends at the district court, the
52. Id. at 201 (citations omitted).
53. See Wilson, 526 U.S. at 612-14.
54. See id. at 615-16.
55. Prior to the Supreme Court's decisions in Wilson and Saucier, the Second Circuit
had taken the position that the analysis performed in the first stage of the qualified immunity
inquiry produced only dicta:
[W]here there is qualified immunity, a court's assertion that a constitutional right
exists would be pure dictum. It would play no role in supporting the action taken
by the court-the dismissal of the case by reason of qualified immunity. Such
dictum would, of course, not be binding in future cases.
Home v. Coughlin, 191 F.3d 244, 247 (2d Cir. 1999) (citations omitted).
56. In California v. Rooney, 483 U.S. 307 (1987) (per curiam), the Supreme Court
dismissed the writ of certiorari as improvidently granted and refused to review a state court's
determination that the police could not use a search of the defendant's trash to support their
application for a search warrant because the state court had upheld the warrant on the basis
of the other evidence used to obtain it. The Court explained,
This Court "reviews judgments, not statements in opinions." Here, the
judgment of the Court of Appeal was entirely in the State's favor-the search
warrant which was the sole focus of the litigation was deemed valid. The fact that
the Court of Appeal reached its decision through analysis different than this Court
might have used does not make it appropriate for this Court to rewrite the
California court's decision, or for the prevailing party to request us to review it.
Id. at 311 (citations omitted).
57. For example, civil rights lawyers may enter into retainer agreements where they
agree to represent the client only at trial without agreeing also to handle appeals. See
Symposium, Ethical Issues Panel, 25 Fordham Urb. L.J. 357, 365 (1998); see also
Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers § 19 cmt. c (2000) ("Clients and
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process of constitutional refinement or elaboration that motivated the
Wilson-Saucier sequencing requirement will be undermined. Decisions by
district courts do not constitute binding precedent. 58 While the Supreme
Court has not decided if determining whether the law was "clearly
established" at the time of the underlying events "should be evaluated by
reference to the opinions of this Court, of the Courts of Appeals, or of the
local District Court[s]," 59 several courts of appeals have held that district
court decisions cannot "clearly establish" constitutional law for purposes of
§ 1983 liability.60
Yet, if the plaintiff does not appeal-thereby enabling the defendant to
argue the alternative ground of no constitutional violation in support of
affirmance-the defendant may have achieved a pyrrhic victory. As an
effective matter, he and the government have been warned to change their
practices in the future. They may quite reasonably decide that the risk in
future litigation that the law will be held to have been clearly established is
not worth taking and thus abandon the challenged practices.
Moreover, if the defendant wins at the court of appeals, where the finding
of a constitutional violation at the first stage of the Wilson-Saucier analysis
does create "clearly established law"-certainly within the particular circuit
and perhaps more broadly-his victory may be even more pyrrhic.
Precisely because many constitutional decisions involve relatively
incremental refinements of broad constitutional principles, the decisions
may be highly fact bound. Such decisions may be unattractive candidates
for review by the Supreme Court.61
This problem is illustrated by Bunting v. Mellen.62 The case involved a §
1983 damages lawsuit by two cadets at the Virginia Military Institute
(VMI) challenging VMI's practice of predinner prayers. The district court
and the court of appeals agreed that the practice violated the First
lawyers may define in reasonable ways the services a lawyer is to provide. .. , for example
to handle a trial but not any appeal .... ").
58. See, e.g., Midlock v. Apple Vacations West, Inc., 406 F.3d 453, 457-58 (7th Cir.
2005); 18 James Wm. Moore et al., Moore's Federal Practice § 134.02(l)(d) (3d. ed. 2006)
("A decision of a federal district court judge is not binding precedent in either a different
judicial district, the same judicial district, or even upon the same judge in a different case.").
59. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 n.32 (1982) (quoting Procunier v.
Navarette, 434 U.S. 555, 565 (1978)).
60. See, e.g., Anderson v. Romero, 72 F.3d 518, 525 (7th Cir. 1995); Richardson v.
Selsky, 5 F.3d 616, 623 (2d Cir. 1993). Indeed, some circuits have refused to find the law to
be clearly established based on decisions from other circuits. See Michael S. Catlett, Clearly
Not Established: Decisional Law and the Qualified Immunity Doctrine, 47 Ariz. L. Rev.
1031, 1044-50 (2005) (surveying the courts of appeals' various standards).
61. See Diane P. Wood, Justice Harry A. Blackmun and the Responsibility of Judging,
26 Hastings Const. L.Q. 11, 13 (1998) ("I am sure that every person here who clerked for
Justice Blackmun (or any other member of the Court, for that matter) evaluated many a
petition for a writ of certiorari with the words 'lower court wrong, but nothing certworthy
here.').
62. 541 U.S. 1019 (2004).
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Amendment's Establishment Clause. 63 However, they held that the law
regarding this issue had not been clearly established by prior decisions. 64
Thus, while the district court granted the plaintiffs declaratory and
injunctive relief forbidding the practice in the future, it entered judgment for
the defendant Superintendent of VMI on their claim for damages. 65 The
cadets and the Superintendent both appealed-the cadets seeking
reinstatement of their claim for damages and the Superintendent
challenging the issuance of declaratory and injunctive relief. The Fourth
Circuit vacated the district court's grant of declaratory and injunctive relief
because the cadets had graduated in the meantime and those claims had
become moot. 66 It affirmed both parts of the district court's holding with
respect to the cadets' damages claims, agreeing that the school-sponsored
and -administered prayers violated the Establishment Clause, but holding
that the law had not been clearly established by prior decisions. 67
Although judgment had been entered in his favor on all claims, the
Superintendent nonetheless sought review in the Supreme Court. The Court
denied certiorari. 68 Justice Antonin Scalia, joined by Chief Justice William
Rehnquist, dissented from the denial of certiorari. He noted the Court's
"settled refusal" to entertain an appeal by a party on an issue as to which the
party prevailed,69 but argued for a relaxation of that rule in qualified
immunity cases: "I think it plain that this general rule should not apply
where a favorable judgment on qualified-immunity grounds would deprive
a party of an opportunity to appeal the unfavorable (and often more
significant) constitutional determination. ' 70 While they voted to deny the
petition for certiorari, Justice John Paul Stevens (joined by Justices Ruth
Bader Ginsburg and Stephen Breyer) termed the problem identified by
Justice Scalia the "byproduct of an unwise judge-made rule" 71-a rule that
all of them had embraced only five years earlier.72 The next year, in
Brosseau v. Haugen,73 the Court summarily reversed a Ninth Circuit
excessive-use-of-force decision on the grounds that the law was not clearly
63. See Mellen v. Bunting, 181 F. Supp. 2d 619, 621, 637 (W.D. Va. 2002), affd, 341
F.3d 312 (4th Cir. 2003).
64. See id. at 637.
65. See id. at 638.
66. Mellen v. Bunting, 327 F.3d 355, 364 (4th Cir. 2003).
67. See id. at 375-76.
68. Bunting v. Mellen, 541 U.S. 1019 (2004).
69. Id. at 1023 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
70. Id.
71. Id. at 1019.
72. The Court cited Justice John Paul Stevens's concurrence from another case stating
that he and Justice Stephen Breyer had "questioned the wisdom of an inflexible rule
requiring the premature adjudication of constitutional issues when the Court adopted it." Id.
(citing County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 858 (1998) (Breyer, J., concurring);
id. at 859 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment)). While that is certainly true, both of
them subsequently joined the Court's opinion in Wilson laying out the sequencing
requirement.
73. 543 U.S. 194 (2004).
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established, while "express[ing] no view as to the correctness of the Court
of Appeals' decision" that the force was in fact unreasonable. 74 Justices
Breyer, Scalia, and Ginsburg filed a concurrence expressing their concern
that the current rule rigidly requires courts unnecessarily to decide
difficult constitutional questions when there is available an easier basis
for the decision (e.g., qualified immunity) that will satisfactorily resolve
the case before the court. Indeed when courts' dockets are crowded, a
rigid "order of battle" makes little administrative sense and can
sometimes lead to a constitutional decision that is effectively insulated
from review. 75
So the Wilson-Saucier sequencing requirement may turn out to be short-
lived.
If the problem with Wilson and Saucier is the possibility of unreviewable
constitutional decisions, rather than docket congestion-and the analysis
Chief Justice Rehnquist offered in Wilson, and Justice Kennedy reiterated in
Saucier, strongly embraces the importance of constitutional refinement-
the question arises whether it is somehow possible to provide review-not
so much for the individual officer, who may well be indifferent to the basis
for his victory, but rather for the governmental body whose policies or
training programs must change.
The difficulty, as I have already suggested, is the potential lack of an
appellee to defend the constitutional judgment below. One solution might
involve formalizing the Wilson-Saucier structure to separate its two
elements. Perhaps the qualified immunity doctrine should be recast so that
defendants would continue to be shielded from compensatory and punitive
damages, but not from nominal damages or declaratory relief. The award of
nominal damages or declaratory relief would often entitle the plaintiffs to
attorney's fees as prevailing parties. 76 The presence of potential attorney's
fees could create an incentive for plaintiffs and their lawyers to continue to
litigate and to appeal the judgment in the defendant's favor on the qualified
immunity issue. Plaintiffs might be far more willing to defend
constitutional holdings, even if the probability of obtaining money damages
is somewhat diminished, if they were essentially provided an attorney to do
SO.
74. Id. at 198.
75. Id. at 201-02 (Breyer, J., concurring).
76. In any § 1983 suit, "the court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party, other
than the United States, a reasonable attorney's fee as part of the costs." 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b)
(2000). The Supreme Court has held that plaintiffs who recover nominal damages in a
constitutional torts case can be prevailing parties under § 1988. See Carey v. Piphus, 435
U.S. 247, 266-67 (1978). The Court limited the entitlement to attorney's fees in nominal
damages cases somewhat in Farrar v. Hobby, 506 U.S. 103 (1992). But the Court's analysis
there, which focused on the fact that nominal damages can "highlight[] the plaintiffs failure
to prove actual, compensable injury," id. at 115, is inapposite to cases where there is no
question that the plaintiff suffered a substantial actual injury as a result of the defendant's
conduct, but is barred from recovery because the law was not previously clearly established.
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While such a solution has obvious advantages in enhancing the
opportunity for constitutional refinement, the Court may in fact be heading
in the opposite direction. As I have pointed out elsewhere, in recent years a
variety of doctrines have undermined the concept of the "private attorney
general" who brings suit to vindicate both her own claims and the broader
public interest. 77 One aspect of this attack has been a limitation on
attorney's fees. 78 This Term, the Court will decide whether preliminary
relief can entitle a party to attorney's fees. 79 It seems unlikely in light of
the Court's other recent attorney's fees decisions that it will approve the
awarding of fees to plaintiffs who do not obtain a final judgment in their
favor. But whatever may be true for plaintiffs who obtain only temporary
relief, plaintiffs who prevail on the first prong of the qualified immunity
inquiry have actually obtained important, lasting relief: They have
vindicated their claim that the government acted unconstitutionally.
III. A WHOLE 'NOTHER CRAZY QUILT: THE EMERGENCE OF THE
ELEVENTEENTH AMENDMENT
As we saw earlier, the Supreme Court revived § 1983 at least in part to
circumvent the barriers to constitutional refinement and victim
compensation posed by the Eleventh Amendment, substituting individual
officer lawsuits for the foreclosed lawsuits against the states. The Court's
recent revival of a robust Eleventh Amendment has added another layer of
paradox to the already jumbled medley of doctrines governing
constitutional litigation.
When Congress wants to regulate activities such as government
employment or government programs, it has two broad sources of authority
on which to draw: its enumerated powers under Article I, § 8 (particularly
the commerce and spending powers) and its Enforcement Clause powers
under the Fourteenth Amendment. 80 For present purposes, the difference
between these two sources of congressional power can be summed up this
way: While the Commerce Clause permits Congress to regulate a wider
array of conduct than the Equal Protection or Due Process Clauses would,
Congress's enforcement authority under the Commerce Clause is decisively
shallower than its authority under the Fourteenth Amendment. In Seminole
Tribe v. Florida, the Supreme Court held that Article I does not empower
Congress to abrogate states' sovereign immunity and authorize individual
victims of illegal conduct to sue state governments. 81 As Seminole Tribe
77. See generally Pamela S. Karlan, Disarming the Private Attorney General, 2003 U.
Ill. L. Rev. 183.
78. See id. at 205-08.
79. See Struhs v. Wyner, 127 S. Ct. 1055 (2007) (granting certiorari to review Wyner v.
Struhs, 179 Fed. Appx. 566 (1 lth Cir. 2006) (per curiam) (holding that a plaintiff who
obtained a preliminary injunction but later lost at the summary judgment stage was
nonetheless a prevailing party for purposes of fees under § 1988(b))).
80. See U.S. Const. art. I, § 8; id. amend. XIV, § 5.
81. Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996).
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itself recognized, however, Congress can abrogate states' sovereign
immunity when it is acting to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment. 82
A centerpiece of the later Rehnquist Court's "federalism revival" was its
articulation of what I have termed the "Eleventeenth Amendment. '83 In a
series of cases, the Court sharply limited Congress's authority to abrogate
states' sovereign immunity in situations where the congressional
prohibition went beyond the self-executing commands of the Equal
Protection and Due Process Clauses. 84
In its last years, the Rehnquist Court backed off a bit. In Nevada
Department of Human Resources v. Hibbs85 and Tennessee v. Lane,86 the
Court upheld congressional abrogations involving the protection of groups
(in Hibbs, women) and rights (in Lane, access to the courts) to which the
Court had already accorded heightened scrutiny.
Last Term, in United States v. Georgia,8 7 the Court, in a surprisingly
unanimous opinion by Justice Scalia, took the analysis one step further.
The case involved a prison inmate, Tony Goodman, who was a paraplegic
and who argued that the state's treatment (which allegedly included leaving
him in his wheelchair for hours where he was unable to turn around or to
use the toilet) violated both the provisions of title II of the Americans with
Disabilities Act (ADA) and the Eighth Amendment. Goodman sued the
state of Georgia for damages under title II. The Court held that "insofar as
Title II creates a private cause of action for damages against the States for
conduct that actually violates the Fourteenth Amendment, Title II validly
abrogates state sovereign immunity. ' 88  Thus, to the extent that the
challenged conduct violated the Eighth Amendment (which was
incorporated against the states through the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment), Congress could abrogate the state's sovereign
immunity. Accordingly, the Supreme Court directed the lower courts on
remand to determine on a claim-by-claim basis whether Goodman could
maintain a damages action. 89
Like a number of the Court's other recent constitutional rulings,
Goodman may have paradoxical consequences. The Court's position seems
to require that courts decide constitutional issues of potentially great
complexity-the kinds of issues that a number of the Justices have
expressed reluctance to address in the context of § 1983 lawsuits-before
applying a statute that is quite a bit clearer with respect to constraints on
82. Id. at 59 (citing Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445 (1976)).
83. Karlan, supra note 77, at 189.
84. See, e.g., Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001); Kimel v.
Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000); Coll. Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary
Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666 (1999); Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v.
Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627 (1999).
85. 538 U.S. 721 (2003).
86. 541 U.S. 509 (2004).
87. 126 S. Ct. 877 (2006).
88. Id. at 882.
89. Id.
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state actions. 90 If courts have to adjudicate an inmate's Eighth, First, or
Fourteenth Amendment claim before they get to the damages claim
afforded by the Americans with Disabilities Act, then the ADA is really
only achieving the elimination of qualified immunity, since it provides
damages against the governmental entity without respect to whether the law
was clearly established at the time. If this is wise and constitutionally
prudent policy with respect to ADA claims, then perhaps Congress should
take the Court's hint and amend § 1983 itself, both to abrogate expressly
states' sovereign immunity (thereby overturning the Supreme Court's
construction of § 1983 in Will v. Michigan Department of State Police,9 1
which had held that states (unlike municipalities) are not "'persons" who can
be sued under § 1983) and to overrule Monell's rejection of respondeat
superior liability.
CONCLUSION
The law governing constitutional refinement is itself in dire need of
refinement. It rests on a series of fictions, ranging from Ex parte Young's
claim that government officials are not really the government. when they act
unconstitutionally, so sovereign immunity does not protect them, to the
qualified immunity cases' assumption that individual officers bear the costs
of their defense and the risk of liability. It calls on district courts to engage
in a potentially valuable process of elaborating constitutional doctrine, but
also undermines the likelihood that that doctrine will receive appellate
review. To return to Justice Cardozo's metaphor, it is time to fashion a new
constitutional garment out of the scraps we are given--one with cleaner,
more elegant lines. Returning constitutional refinement to a process in
which the government to be regulated is a formal participant in the
litigation would be an important first step.
90. Under the so-called "Ashwander doctrine," the Supreme Court prefers that cases be
decided on statutory rather than constitutional grounds when possible. See Ashwander v.
TVA, 297 U.S. 288, 347 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring). Of course, the Court's Eleventh
Amendment jurisprudence requires reaching the constitutional issues.
91. 491 U.S. 58 (1989).
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